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United States v. Jones
10-1259
Ruling Below: United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), rehearing en bane
denied, United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 2010), eert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 671 (U.S.
2010), eert. granted, 10-12592011 WL 1456728 (U.S. June 27, 2011).
In 2004, authorities began investigating Antoine Jones and his co-:defendant Lawrence Maynard
for narcotics violations. As part of this investigation, a GPS tracldng device was placed on
Jones's Jeep and used to track his movements 24 hours per day for a period of one month. On
October 25th, Jones and several others were charged with several offenses including conspiracy
to distribute cocaine and cocaine base. After a 2006 mistrial, Jones and Maynard were tried
jointly in November of 2007 and found guilty. Jones and Maynard appealed jointly arguing the
district court e11'ed on several counts. Added to the joint arguments, Jones independently argued
the evidence obtained through GPStracking violated his Fourth Amendment rights and as such,
the district court e11'ed in admitting that evidence.
Questions Presented: (1) Whether the warrantless use of a tracking device on petitioner's
vehicle to monitor its movements on public streets violated the Fourth Amendment. (2) Whether
the government violated respondent's Fourth Amendmentrights by installing the GPS tracking
device on his vehicle without a valid wa11'ant and without his consent.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee

v.
Lawrence MAYNARD, Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit
Decided August 6, 2010
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
GINSBURG, Circuit Judge:
The appellants, Antoine Jones and Lawrence
Maynard, appeal their convictions after a
joint trial for conspiracy to distribute and to
possess with intent to distribute five
kilograms or more of cocaine and 50 grams
or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. Maynard also
challenges the sentence imposed by the
district comi. Because the appellants'
convictions arise from the same underlying
facts and they make several overlapping
arguments, we consolidated their appeals.

For the reasons that follow, we reverse
Jones's and affirm Maynard's convictions.

I. Background
Jones owned and Maynard managed the
"Levels" nightclub in the District of
Columbia. In 2004 an FBI-Metropolitan
Police Depatiment Safe Streets Task Force
began investigating the two for narcotics
violations. The investigation culminated in
searches and arrests on October 24, 2005.
We discuss that investigation and the drug
distribution operation it uncovered in greater
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detail where relevant to the appellants'
arguments on appeal.
On October 25 Jones and several alleged coconspirators were charged with, among
other things, conspiracy to distribute and to
possess with intent to distribute cocaine and
cocaine base. Maynard, who was added as a
defendant in superseding indictments filed
in March and June 2006, pled guilty in June
2006.
In October 2006 Jones and a number of his
co-defendants went to trial. The jury
acquitted the co-defendants on all counts but
one; it could not reach a verdict on the
remaining count, which was eventually
dismissed. The jury acquitted Jones on a
number of counts but could not reach a
verdict on the conspiracy charge, as to
which the coUrt declared a mistrial. Soon
thereafter the district. court allowed Maynard
to withdraw his guilty plea.
In March 2007 the Government filed another
superseding indictment charging Jones,
Maynard, and a few co-defendants with a
single count of conspiracy to distribute and
to possess with intent to distribute five or
more kilograms of cocaine and 50 or more
grams of cocaine base. A joint trial of Jones
and Maynard began in November 2007 and
ended in January 2008, when the jury found
them both gUilty.

II. Analysis: Joint Issues
Jones and Maynard jointly argue the district
court erred in (1) admitting evidence
gleaned from wiretaps of their phones, (2)
admitting evidence arising from a search
incident to a traffic stop, (3) denying their
motion to dismiss the indictment as invalid.
because it was handed down by a grand jury
that had expired, (4) declining to instruct the
jury on their theory that the evidence at trial
suggested multiple conspiracies, and (5)

declining to grant immunity to .several
defense witnesses who invoked the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States and refused to testify. Jones
also argues the court en-ed in admitting
evidence acquired by the wan-antless use of
a Global Positioning System (GPS) device
to track his. movements continuously for a
month. After concluding none of the joint
issues wan-ants reversal, we turn to Jones's.
individual argument.

III. Analysis: Evidence Obtained from
GPS Device
Jones argues his conviction should be
overturned because the police violated the
Fourth
Amendment
prohibition
of
"unreasonable searches" by tracking his
movements 24 hours a day for four weeks
with a GPS device they had installed on his
Jeep without a valid wan-ant. We, consider
first whether that use of the device was a
search and then, having concluded it was,
consider whether it was reasonable and
.whether any en-or was harmless.

A; Was Use ofGPS a Search?
For his part, Jones argues the use of the GPS
device violated his "reasonable expectation
of privacy," Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 360-61, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576
(1967) (Harlan, J., concun-ing), and was
therefore a search subject to the
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. Of course, the Government
agrees the Katz test applies here, but it
argues we need not consider whether Jones's
expectation of privacy was reasonable
because that question was answered in
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 103
S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55. (1983), in which
the Supreme Court held the use of a beeper
device to aid in tracking a suspect to his
drug lab was not· a search. As explained
below, we hold Knotts does not govern this
3

case and the police action was a search
because it defeated Jones's reasonable
expectation of privacy. We then turn to the
Government's claim our holding necessarily
implicates prolonged visual surveillance.
1. Knotts is not controlling

The Government argues this case falls
squarely within the holding in Knotts that
"[a] person traveling in an automobile oli
public thoroughfares has no reasonable
expectation of. privacy in his movements
from one place to another." In that case the
police had planted a beeper in a five-gallon
container of chemicals before it was
purchased by one of Knotts's coconspirators; monitoring the progress of the
car carrying the beeper, the police followed
.'the container as it was driven from the
"place of purchase, in Minneapolis,
Minnesota, to [Knotts's] secluded cabin near
Shell Lake, Wisconsin," a trip of about 100
miles. Because the co-conspirator, by
driving on public roads, "voluntarily
conveyed to anyone who wanted to look"
his progress and route, he could not
reasonably expect privacy in "the fact of his
final destination."
The Court explicitly distinguished between
the limited information discovered by use of
the beeper-movements during a discrete
journey-and more 'comprehensive or
sustained monitoring of the sort at issue in
this case. Most important for the present
case, the Court specifically reserved the
question whether a warrant would be
required in a case involving "twenty-four
hour surveillance," stating
if such dragnet-type law enforcement
practices 'as respondent envisions
should eventually occur, there will
be time enough then to determine
whether different constitutional
principles may be applicable.

Id at 283-84, 103 S.Ct. 1081.
Although the Government, focusing upon
the term "dragnet," suggests Knotts reserved
the Fourth Amendment question that would
be raised by mass surveillance, not the
question raised by prolonged surveillance of
a single individual, that is not what
happened., In reserving the "dragnet"
question, the Court was not only addressing
but in part actually quoting the defendant's
argument that, if a warrant is not required,
"twenty-four
hour
then
prolonged
surveillance of any citizen of this country
will be possible, without judicial knowledge
or supervision." The Court avoided the
question whether prolonged "twenty-four
hour surveillance" was a search by limiting
its holding to the facts of the case before it,
as to which it stated "the reality hardly
suggests abuse."
In short, Knotts held only that "[a] person
traveling in an automobile on public
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in his movements from one place
to another," not that such a person has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements whatsoever, world without end,
as the Government would have it. The Fifth
Circuit likewise has recognized the limited
scope of the holding in Knotts, as has the
New York Court of Appeals.
Two circuits, relying upon Knotts, have held
the use of a GPS tracking device to monitor
an individual's movements in his vehicle
over a prolonged period is not a search,
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d
1212 (9th Cir.2010);· United States v.
Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir.2007), but in
neither case did the appellant argue that
Knotts by its terms does not control whether
prolonged surveillance is a search, as Jones
argues here. Indeed, in Garcia the appellant
explicitly conceded the point. Br. of
Appellant at 22 (No. 06-2741) ("Garcia does
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not contend that he has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the movements of
his vehicle while equipped with the GPS
tracking device as it made its way through
public thoroughfares. Knotts. His challenge
rests solely with whether the warrantless
installation of the GPS device, in and of
itself, violates the Fourth Amendment.").
Thus prompted, the Seventh Circuit read
Knotts as blessing all "tracking of a vehicle
on public streets" and addressed only
"whether installing the device in the vehicle
converted the subsequent tracking into a
search." The court viewed use of a GPS
device as being more akin to hypothetical
practices it assumed are not searches, such
as tracking a car "by' means of cameras
mounted on lampposts or satellite imaging,"
than it is to practices the Supreme Court has
held are searches, such as attaching a
listening device to a person's phone. For that
reason it held installation of the GPS device
was not a search. Similarly,· the Ninth
Circuit perceived no distinction between
short- and long-term surveillance; it noted
the appellant had "acknowledged" Knotts
controlled the case and addressed only
whether Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001), in
which the Court held the use of a thermal
imaging device to detect the temperature
inside a home defeats the occupant's
reasonable expectation of privacy, had
"heavily modified the FOUlih Amendment
analysis." Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at
1216.
In a third related case the Eighth Circuit held
the use of a GPS device to track a truck used
by a drug trafficking operation was not a
search. United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d
604 (2010). After holding the appellant had
no standing to challenge the use of the GPS
device, the cOUli went on to state in the·
alternative:
Even if Acosta had standing, we

would find no error. . . . [W]hen
police have reasonable suspicion that
a particular vehicle is transporting
drugs, a walTant is not required
when, while the vehicle is parked in
a public. place, they install a noninvasive GPS tracking device on it
for a reasonable period of time.
Id at 609-10.

In each of these three cases the court
expressly reserved the issue it seems to have
thought the Supreme COUli had reserved in
Knotts, to wit, whether "wholesale" or
"mass" electronic surveillance of many
individuals requires a warrant. As. we have
explained, in Knotts the Court actually
reserved the issue of prolonged surveillance.
That issue is squarely presented in this case.
Here the police used the GPS device not to
track Jones's "movements from one place to
. another," but rather to track Jones's
movements 24 hours a day for 28 days as he
moved among scores of places, thereby
discovering· the totality and pattern of his
movements from place to place to place.

2. Were Jones's locations exposed to the
public?
As the Supreme Court observed in Kyllo, the
"Katz test-whether the individual has an
expectation of privacy that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable-has
often been criticized as circular, and hence
subjective and unpredictable." 533 U.S. at
34, 121 S.Ct. 2038. Indeed, the Court has
invoked various and varying considerations
in applying the test. This much is clear,
however: Whether an expectation of privacy
is reasonable depends in large part upon
whether that expectation relates to
information that has been "expose[d] to the
public."
Two

considerations

persuade

us

the
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information the police discovered in this
case-the totality of Jones's movements
over . the course of a month-'was not
exposed to the public: First, unlike one's
movements during a single journey, the
whole of one's movements over the course
of a month is not actually exposed to the
public because the likelihood anyone will
observe all those movements is effectively
nil. Second, the whole of one's movements
is not exposed constructively even though
each individual movement is exposed,
because that whole reveals moresometimes a great deal more-than does the
sum of its parts.
a. Actually exposed?
The holding in Knotts flowed naturally from
the reasoning in Katz: "What a person
knowingly exposes to the public ... is not a
subject of FOUlih Amendment protection."
The Government argues the same reasoning
applies here as well. We first consider the
precedent governing our analysis of whether
the subject of a purported search has been
exposed to the public, then hold the
information the police discovered using the
GPS device was not so exposed.
(i) Precedent

The Government argues Jones's movements
. over the course of a month were actually
exposed to the public. because the police
lawfully could have followed Jone.s
everywhere he went on public roads over the
course· of a month. The Government
implicitly poses the wrong question,
however.
In considering whether something is
"exposed" to the public as that term was
used in Katz we ask not what another person
can physically and may lawfully do b.ut
rather what a reasonable person expects
another might actually do. Indeed, in Riley,

Justice O'Connor, whose concurrence was
necessary to the judgment, pointed out:
Ciraolo's expectation of privacy was
umeasonable not because the
airplane was operating where it had a
"right to be," but because public air
travel at 1,000 feet is a sufficiently
routine part of modem life that it is
unreasonable for persons on the
ground to expect that their curtilage
will not be observed from the air at
that altitude.

If the public rarely, if ever, travels
overhead at such altitudes, the
observation cannot be said to be
from a vantage point generally used
by the public and Riley cannot be
said to have "knowingly expose[d]"
his greenhouse to public view. .
488 U.S. at 453, 455, 109 S.Ct. 693; see also
id. at 467, 109 S.Ct. 693 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (explaining five justices agreed
"the reasonableness of Riley's expectation
depends, in large measure, on the frequency
of nonpolice helicopter flights at an altitude
of 400 feet").
The Supreme Court re-affirmed this
approach in Bond v. United States, 529 U.S.
334, 120 S.Ct. 1462, 146 L.Ed.2d 365
(2000). There a passenger on a bus traveling
to Arkansas from California had placed his
soft luggage in the overhead storage area
above his seat. During a routine stop at an
off-border immigration checkpoint in Sierra
Blanca, Texas, a Border Patrol agent
squeezed the luggage in order to determine
whether it contained drugs and thus detected
a brick of what turned out to' be
methamphetamine. The defendant argued
the agent had defeated his reasonable
expectation of privacy, and the Government
6

argued his expectation his bag would not be
squeezed was unreasonable because he had
exposed it to the public. The Court
responded:
[A] bus passenger clearly expects
that his bag may be handled. He does
not expect that other passengers or
bus employees will, as a matter of
course, feel the bag in an exploratory
manner. But this is exactly what the
agent did here. We therefore hold
that
the
agent's
physical
manipulation of petitioner's bag
violated the Fourth Amendment.
Id at 338-39, 120 S.Ct. 1462.

The Court focused not upon what other
passengers could have done or what a bus
company employee might have done, but
rather upon what a reasonable bus passenger
expects others he may encounter, i.e., fellow
passengers or bus company employees,
might actually do .. A similar focus can be
seen in Kyllo, in which the Court held use of
a thermal imaging device defeats the
subject's reasonable expectation of privacy,
"at least where . . . the· technology in
question is not in general public use."
The Government cites as authority to the
contrary our statement in United States v.
Gbemisola, 225 F.3d 753, 759 (2000), that
"[t]h6 decisive issue . . . is not what the
officers saw but what they could have seen."
When read in context, however, this snippet
too supports the view that whether
something is "expose[d] to the public,"
depends not upon the theoretical possibility,
but upon the actual likelihood, of discovery
by a stranger:
The decisive issue ... is not what the
officers saw but what they could
have seen. At any time, the
surveillance vehicle could have

pulled alongside of the taxi and the
officers
could have
watched
Gbemisola through its window.
Indeed, the taxi driver himself could
. have seen the event. simply by
looking in his rear-view mirror or
turning around. As one cannot have a
reasonable expectation of privacy
concerning an act performed within
the visual range of a complete
stranger, the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement was not
implicated.
225 F.3d at 759.
In short, it was not at all unlikely Gbemisola
would be observed opening a package while
seated in the rear of a taxi, in plain view of
the driver and perhaps of others.
(ii) Application
Applying the foregoing analysis to the
present facts, we hold the whole of a·
person's movements over the course of a
month is not actually exposed to the public
because the likelihood a stranger would
observe all those movements is not just
remote, it is essentially nil. It is one thing for
a passerby to observe or even to. follow
someone during a single journey as he goes
to the market or returns home from work It
is another thing entirely for that stranger to
pick up the scent again the next day and the
day after that, week in and week out,
dogging his prey until he has identified all
the places, people, amusements, and chores
that make up that person's hitherto private
routine.
b. Constructively exposed?
The Government does not separately raise,
but we would be remiss if we did not
address, the possibility that although the
whole of Jones's movements during the
7

month for which the police monitored him
was not actually exposed to the public, it
was constructively exposed because each of
his individual movements during that time
was itself in public view. When it comes to
privacy, however, precedent suggests that
the whole may be more revealing than the
parts. Applying that precedent to the
circumstances of this case, we hold the
information the police discovered using the
GPS device was not constructively exposed.

just whether a reasonable person expects any
given number he dials to be exposed to the
phone company but also whether he expects
all the numbers he dials to be compiled in a
list. The Court explained that Smith could
not reasonably expect privacy in the list of
numbers because that list was composed of
information that he had "voluntarily
conveyed to [the company]" and that "it had
facilities for recording and . . . was free to
record."

(i) Precedent

If, for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment, the privacy interest in a whole
could be no greater (or no different) than the
privacy interest in its constituent parts, then.
the Supreme Court would have had no
reason to consider at length whether Smith
could have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the list of numbers he had called.
Indeed,
Justice
Stewart
dissented
specifically because he thought the
difference was significant on the facts of
that case. See id. at 747, 99 S.Ct. 2577
("such a list [of all the telephone numbers
one called] easily could reveal ... the most
intimate details of a person's life").

The Supreme Court addressed the
distinction between a whole and the sum of
its parts in United States Department of
Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom
of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 109 S.Ct. 1468, 103
LEd.2d 774 (1989), which arose not under
the Fourth Amendment but under the
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §
552. There the respondents had requested,
pursuant to the FOIA, that the FBI disclose
rap sheets compiling the criminal records of
certain named persons. Although the
"individual events in those summaries
[were] matters of public record," the Court
upheld the FBI's invocation of the privacy
exception to the FOIA, holding the subjects'
had a privacy interest in the aggregated
'-'whole" distinct from their interest in the
"bits of information" of which it was
composed. Most relevant to the Fourth
Amendment, the Court said disclosure of a
person's rap sheet "could reasonably be
expected to constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy."
The Court implicitly recognized the
distinction between the whole and the sum
of the parts in the Fourth Amendment case
of Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99
S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979). There, in
holding the use of a pen register to record all .
the numbers dialed from a person's phone
was not a search, the Court considered not

(ii) Application

The whole of one's movements over the
course of a month is not constructively
exposed to the public because, like a rap
sheet, that whole reveals far more than the
individual movements it comprises. The
difference is not one of degree but of kind,
for no single journey reveals the habits and
patterns that mark the distinction between a
day in the life and a way of life, nor the
departure from a routine that, like the dog
that did not bark in the Sherlock Holmes
story, may reveal even more.
As with the "mosaic theory" often invoked
by the Government in cases involving
national security information,· "What may
seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear
8

of great moment to one who has a broad
view of the scene." Prolonged surveillance
reveals types of information not revealed by
short-term surveillance, such as what a
person does repeatedly, what he does not do,
and what he does ensemble. These types of
information can each reveal more about a
person than does any individual trip viewed
in isolation. Repeated visits to a church, a
gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told
by any single visit, as does one's not visiting
any of these places over the course of a
month. The sequence of a person's
movements can reveal still more; a single
trip to a gynecologist's office tells little·
about a woman, but that trip followed a few
.weeks later by a visit to a baby supply store
tells a different story. A person who knows
all of another's travels can deduce whether
he is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker,
a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband,
an outpatient receiving medical treatment,
. an associate of particular individuals or
political groups-and not just one such fact
about a person, but all such facts.
Other courts have recognized prolonged
surveillance of a person's movements may
reveal an intimate picture of his life. Indeed,
they have reached that conclusion in cases
involving prolonged GPS monitoring. See
People v. Weaver, 12 N.y'3d 433, 882
N.Y.S.2d 357, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199
(2009) (Prolonged GPS monitoring "yields .
. . a highly· detailed profile, not simply of
where we go, but by easy inference, of our
associations-political, religious, amicable
and amorous, to name only a few-and of
the pattern of our professional and
avocational pursuits"); State v. Jackson, 150
Wash.2d 251, 76 P.3d 217, 224 (2003) (en
banc) ("In this age, vehicles are used to take
people to a vast number of places that can
reveal preferences, alignments, associations,
personal ails and foibles. The GPS tracking
devices record all of these travels, and thus
can provide a detailed picture of one's

life.").
A reasonable person does not expect anyone
to monitor and retain a record of every time
he drives his car, including his origin, route,
destination, and each place he stops and how
long he stays there; rather, he expects each
of
those
movements
to
remain
"disconnected and anonymous." In this way
the extended recordation of a person's
movements is, like the "manipulation of a
bus passenger's carry-on" canvas bag in
Bond, not what we expect anyone to do, and
it reveals more than we expect anyone to
know.
3. Was Jones's expectation of privacy
reasonable?
It does not apodictically follow that, because
the aggregation of Jones's movements over
the course of a month was not exposed to
the public, his expectation of privacy in
those
movements
was
reasonable',
"legitimation of expectations of privacy
must have a source outside the Fourth
Amendment," such as "understandings that
are recognized or permitted by society," So
it is that, because the "Congress has decided
. . . to treat the interest in 'privately'
as
illegitimate,"
possessing
cocaine
"governmental conduct that can reveal
whether a substance is cocaine, and no other
arguably 'private' fact, compromises no
legitimate privacy interest."

The
Government
suggests
Jones's
expectation of privacy in his movements
was unreasonable because those movements
took place in his vehicle, on a public way,
rather than inside his home. That the police
tracked Jones's movements in his Jeep
rather than in his home is celiainly relevant
to the reasonableness of his expectation of
privacy; "in the sanctity of the home," the
COUli has observed, "all details are intimate
details." A person does not leave his privacy
9

behind when he walks out his front door,
however. On the contrary, in Katz the Court
clearly stated "what [one] seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected."
Or, as this court has said, outside the home,
the "Fourth Amendment . . . secur[es] for
each individual a private enclave, a 'zone'
bounded by the individual's own reasonable
expectations of privacy."
Application of the test in Katz and its
sequellae to the facts of this case can lead to
only one conclusion: Society recognizes
Jones's expectation of privacy in his
movements over the course of a month as
reasonable, and the use of the GPS device to
monitor those movements defeated that
reasonable expectation. As we have
discussed, prolonged GPS monitoring
reveals an intimate picture of the subject's
life that he expects no one to have-short
perhaps of his spouse. The intrusion such
monitoring makes into the subject's private
affairs stands. in stark contrast to the
relatively brief intrusion at issue in Knotts;
indeed it exceeds the intrusions occasioned
by every police practice the Supreme Court
has deemed a search under Katz, such as a
. urine test, use of an electronic listening
device to tap a payphone, inspection of a
traveler's luggage, or use of a thelmal
imaging device to discover the temperature
inside a home.
We note without surprise, therefore, that the
Legislature of California, in maldng it
unlawful for anyone but a law enforcement
agency to "use an electronic tracking device
to determine the location or movement of a
person," specifically declared "electronic
tracking of a person's location without that
person's knowledge violates that person's
reasonable expectation of privacy," and
implicitly but necessarily thereby required a
warrant for police use of a GPS. Several
other states have enacted legislation

imposing civil and criminal penalties for the .
use of electronic tracking devices and
expressly requiring exclusion of evidence
produced by such a device unless obtained
by the police acting pursuant to a warrant.
Although perhaps not conclusive evidence
of nationwide "societal understandings,"
these state laws are indicative that prolonged
GPS monitoring defeats an expectation of
privacy that our society recognizes as
reasonable. So, too, are the considered
judgments of every court to which the issue
has been squarely presented. The federal
circuits that have held use of a GPS device
is not a search were not alert to' the
distinction drawn in Knotts between shortterm and prolonged surveillance, but we
have already explained our disagreement on
that collateral point.
4. Visual surveillance distinguished

The Government would have us abjure this
conclusion on the ground that "[Jones's]
argument logically would prohibit even
visual surveillance of persons or vehicles
located in public places and exposed to
public view, which clearly is not the law."
We have already explained why Jones's
argument does not "logically . . . prohibit"
milch visual surveillance: Surveillance that
reveals only what is already exposed to the
public-such as a person's movements
during a single journey-is not a search.
Regarding visual surveillance so prolonged
it reveals information not exposed to the
public, we note preliminarily that the
Government points to not a single actual
example of visual surveillance that will be
affected by our holding the use of the GPS
in this case was a search. No doubt the
reason is that practical considerations·
prevent visual surveillance from lasting very
long. Continuous human surveillance for a
week would require all the time and expense
. 10

of several police officers, while comparable
photographic surveillance would require a
net of video cameras so dense and so
widespread as to catch a person's every
movement, plus the manpower to piece the
photographs together. Of course, as this case
and some of the GPS cases in other courts
illustrate, prolonged GPS monitoring is not
similarly constrained. On the contrary, the
marginal cost of an additional day-or
week, or month-of GPS monitoring is
effectively zero. Nor, apparently, is the fixed
cost of installing a GPS device significant;
the Los Angeles Police Department can now
affix a GPS device to a passing car simply
by launching a GPS-enabled dart. For these
practic~l reasons, and not by virtue of its
sophistication or novelty, the advent of GPS
technology has occasioned a heretofore
unknown type of intrusion into an ordinarily
and hitherto private enclave.

warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. As the Supreme Court said in
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, "Fourth
Amendment cases must be decided on the
facts of each case, not by extravagant
generalizations. 'We have never held that
potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of
privacy constitute searches for purposes of
the FOUlih Amendment.'" 476 U.S. 227, 238
n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 1819, 90 L.Ed.2d 226 (1986)
(quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705, 712, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530
(1984». By the same token, we refuse to
hold this "search is not a search," merely
because a contrary holding might at first
blush seem to implicate a different but
intuitively permissible practice. Instead, just
as the Supreme Court in Knotts reserved the
lawfulness of prolonged beeper surveillance,
we reserve the lawfulness of prolonged
visual surveillance .

. The Government's argument-that our
holding the use of the GPS device was a
search necessarily implicates prolonged
visual surveillance-fails even on its own
terms. That argument relies implicitly upon
an assumption rejected explicitly in Kyllo, to
wit, that the means used to uncover private
information play no role in determining
whether a police action frustrates a person's
reasonable expectation of privacy; when it
comes to the Fourth Amendment, means do
matter. For example, the police may without
a warrant record one's conversations by
planting an undercover agent in one's midst,
but may not do the same by wiretapping
one's phone, even "without any trespass."
Quite simply, in the former case one's
reasonable expectation of control over one's
personal information would not be defeated;
in the latter it would be.

B.
Was
the
Nonetheless?

This case does not require us to, and
therefore we do not, decide whether a
hypothetical instance of prolonged visual
surveillance would be a search subject to the

Search

Reasonable

A search conducted without a warrant is
"per· se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions." Here, because the police
installed the GPS device on Jones's vehicle
without . a valid warrant, the Government
argues the resulting search can be upheld as
a reasonable application of the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement. Under ..
that exception, "[i]f a car is readily mobile
and probable cause exists to believe it
contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment
. . . permits police to search the vehicle
without more."
As Jones points out, this argument is doubly
off the mark. First, the Government did not
raise it below. Second, the automo bile
exception permits the police to search a car
without a warrant if they have reason to
believe it contains contraband; the exception
11

does not authorize them to install a tracldng
device on a car without the approval of a
neutral magistrate.
C. Was the Error Harmless?

Finally, the Government argues in a terse
and conclusory few lines that the district
court's error in admitting evidence obtained
by use of the GPS device was harmless.
"The beneficiary of -a constitutional error
[must prove] beyond a reasonable doubt that
the error complained of did not contribute to
the verdict obtained."
According
to
the
Government,
"Overwhelming evidence implicated [Jones]
in the drug-distribution conspiracy."
Overwhelming evidence certainly showed
there was a conspiracy to distribute and to
possess with intent to distrihute drugs based
out of 9508 Potomac Drive, Ft. Washington,
Maryland, where police found $850,000 in
cash, 97 kilograms of cocaine, and one
kilogram of cocaine base. The evidence
linking Jones to that conspiracy, however,
was not strong, let alone overwhelming.
The Government points to no evidence of a
drug transaction in which Jones was
involved, nor any evidence that Jones ever
possessed any drugs. Instead it relies upon
(1) the testimony of admitted participants in
the conspiracy, one of whom (Bermea) was
at the Potomac Drive house when the police
arrived-to the effect that Jones was the
ringleader of the operation and frequented
the Potomac Drive house, (2) data showing
Jones used his cell-phone frequently and
often called some of the conspirators,
including one whose phone was found at the
Potomac Drive house, (3) leases in Jones's
name for other properties the Government
alleged were used in furtherance of the
conspiracy, (4) currency seized from Jones's
Jeep and mini-van, and (5) physical and
photographic surveillance showing Jones

visited the Potomac Drive house a few
times. Jones's defense responded to each
type of evidence as follows: (1) the
cooperating witnesses had cut deals with the
Government and were not credible, (2) the
cell-phone records and (5) visits to Potomac
Drive showed only that Jones knew the
participants in the conspiracy, (3) Jones
leased the other properties for legitimate
purposes and no drugs were found there, (4)
and his nightclub was a cash business.
The GPS data were essential to the
Government's case. By combining them
with Jones's cell-phone records the
Government was able to paint a picture of
Jones's movements that made credible the
allegation that he was involved in drug
trafficldng. In his closing statement the
Government attorney summarized this way
the inference he was asking the jury to draw:
[W]hen there is a conversation with
Bermea and [Jones] says, I'm
coming to see you, or I'll be there in
ten minutes, and within a while . . .
the GPS shows that that vehicle is in
Potomac Drive, how does that all fit
together? Well it fits together exactly
as you know. That the defendant is
going to 9508 Potomac Drive, and
there's no reason anyone goes there
other than drug activity.

***
Then, that follows these series of
conversations,' day after day, GPS
reading after .GPS reading, with the
defendant speaking with [Bermea]
and then the vehicle coming to
Potomac Drive .... You'll have the
timeline.
You've
got
the
conversations. I won't go through
them all."
Tl·. 1/3/08 at 114-18.
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As mentioned earlier, the Government had
also stressed in its opening remarks, which
would color the jury's understanding of the
whole case, that the GPS data would
demonstrate Jones's involvement in the
conspiracy,

evidence that Jones was actually involved in
the
conspiracy
is
so
far
from
"overwhelming" that we are constrained to
hold the Government has not carried its
burden of showing the error was 'harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.

To be sure, absent the GPS data a jury
reasonably might have inferred Jones was
involved in the conspiracy, "We 'are not
concerned here," however, "with whether
there was sufficient evidence on which
[Jones] could have been convicted without
the evidence complained of'; rather oUr
concern is with "whether there is a
reasonable possibility that the evidence
complained of might have contributed to the
conviction," Without the GPS data the

IV. Conclusion

Maynard's conviction and sentence are
affirmed because neither any of the
appellants' joint arguments nor Maynard's
individual argument warrants reversal.'
Jones's conviction is reversed because it was
obtained with evidence procured in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.
So ordered,
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UNITED STATES of America, Appellee
v.
Antoine JONES, Appellant.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit
November 19, 2010
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
GINSBURG, TATEL and GRIFFITH,
Circuit Judges, concurring in the denial of
rehearing en banc:
In response to the Government's petition,
we underline two matters. First, because the
Government did not argue the points, the
court did not decide whether, absent a
warrant, either reasonable suspicion or
probable cause would have been sufficient
. to render the use of the GPS lawful; to the
extent the Government invoked the
automobile exception to the warrant
requirement, as we pointed out, that
exception applies only when "a car is readily .
mobile and probable cause exists to believe
it contains contraband,". neither of which
elements the Government satisfied. Second,
the Government's petition complains that
the court's opinion "implicitly calls into
question common and important practices
such as sustained visual surveillance· and
photographic surveillance of public places,"
but that is not correct. The court explicitly
noted: "This case does not require us to, and
therefore we do not, decide whether a
hypothetical instance of prolonged visual
surveillance would be a search subject to the
warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. "
SENTELLE, Chief Judge, joined by
HENDERSON,
BROWN,
and
KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, dissenting
from the denial of tehearing en banc:
The panel opinion in this case held that the

government's warrantless use of a global
positioning system ("GPS") device to track
the public movements of appellant Antoine
Jones's vehicle for approximately four
weeks was an umeasonable search in
violation of Jones's Fourth Amendment
rights. In my view, this question should be
reviewed by the court enbanc because the
panel's decision is inconsistent not only with
every other federal circuit· which has
considered the case, but more importantly,
with controlling Supreme Court precedent
set forth in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S.
276, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983).
In Knotts, the Supreme Court reviewed a
case in which law enforcement officers had
placed a radio transmitter ("beeper") inside a
chloroform container which was in turn
placed inside a motor vehicle. Through the
use of the electronic signals from the beeper,
the police tracked the chloroform container
from one automobile to another across the
length of an interstate journey from
Minneapolis, Minnesota, to Shell Lake,
Wisconsin. The information obtained from
the electronic monitoring was augmented by
intern1ittent physical surveillance and by
monitoring from.a helicopter. In upholding
the constitutionality of the surveillance by
electronic monitoring, the Supreme Court
reviewed the establishment of the privacy
interest as the principal right protected by
the FOUlih Amendment's guarantee. To
. bri~fly summarize the Court's jurisprudence
from Knotts and its predecessors: if there is
no invasion of a reasonable expectation of
14

privacy, there is no violation of the Fourth
"against
Amendment
protection
unreasonable searches and seizures."
Applying that jurisprudence to the
electronically enhanced surveillance in
Knotts, the Court declared that "[a] person
traveling in an automobile on public
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in his movements from one place
to another." The Court went on to note that
"[w]hen [the suspect] traveled over the
public streets, he voluntarily conveyed to
anyone who wanted to look the fact that he
was traveling over particular roads in a
particular direction, the fact of whatever
stops he made, and the fact of his final
destination when he" exited from public
roads onto private property." The Court
. further reasoned that since visual
surveillance from public places along the
route or adjacent to the destination would
have revealed all of the same information to
the police, "[t]he fact that the officers ...
relied not only on visual surveillance, but
also on the use of the beeper to signal the
presence of [the suspect's] automobile to the
police receiver, does not alter the situation."
Central to the Knotts COUli's reasoning, and,
I think, controlling in this case· is the
observation that "[n]othing in the Fourth
Amendment prohibited the police from
augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed
upon them at bhih with such enhancement
as science and technology afforded them in
this case."
Everything the Supreme Court stated in
Knotts is equally applicable to the facts of
the present controversy. There is no material
difference between tracking the movements
of the Knotts defendant with a beeper and
tracking the Jones appellant with a GPS. The
panel opinion distinguishes Knotts-I think
unconvincingly-not on the basis that what
the police did in that case is any different
than this, but that the volume of information

obtained is greater in the present case than in
Knotts. The panel asserts that "the" totality of
Jones's movements over the course of a
month ... was not exposed to the public."
The panel reasoned that "first, unlike one's
movements during a single journey, the
whole of one's movements over the course
of a month is not actually exposed to the
public because the likelihood anyone will
observe all these movements is effectively
nil." I suggest that this assertion in no way
demonstrates that Jones's movements were
not exposed to the public. The fact that no
particular individual se.es them all does not
make the movements any less public. Nor is
it evident at what point the likelihood of a
successful continued" surveillance becomes
so slight that the. panel would deem the
otherwise public exposure of driving on a
public thoroughfare to become private. As
the Knotts COUli recalled, it is well
established that "[w]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public ... is not a subject of
FOUlih Amendment protection." In applying
that principle in Knotts, the Supreme Court
declared that "a person traveling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements from one place to another."
The panel opinion seems to recognize that
Jones had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in any particular datum revealed by
the GPS-augmented surveillance, but
somehow acquired one through "the totality
of Jones's movements over the course of a
month." In the view of the panel, this is true
"because that whole reveals more . . . than
does the sum of its parts." While this may be
true, it is not evident how it affects the
reasonable expectation of privacy bY' Jones.
The reasonable expectation of privacy as to
a person's movements on the highway is, as
concluded in Knotts, zero. The sum of an
infinite number of zero-value parts is also
zero. Nowhere in Knotts or any other
Supreme COUli Fourth Amendment decision
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since the adoption of the expectation of
privacy rationale in Katz has the Court ever
suggested that the test of the reasonable
expectation is. in any way related to the
intent of the user of the data obtained by the
surveillance or other alleged search. The
words "reasonable expectation of· privacy"
themselves suggest no such element. The
expectation of privacy is on the part of the
observed, not the observer. Granted, the
degree of invasion of that expectation may
be measured by the invader's intent, but an
invasion does not occur unless there is such
a reasonable expectation.
Lest the importance of this opmlOn be
underestimated, I would note that the
invasion the panel found was not in the use
of the GPS device, but in the aggregation of
the information obtained. Presumably, had
the GPS device been used for an hour or
perhaps a day, or whatever period the panel
believed. was consistent with a normal
surveillance, the evidence obtained could
have been admitted without Fourth
Amendment problem. Therefore, it would
appear, as appellee argues, that this novel
aggregation approach to the reasonable
expectation of privacy would prohibit not
only GPS-augmented surveillance, but any
other police surveillance of sufficient length
to support consolidation of data into the sort
of pattern or mosaic contemplated by the
panel. True, the panel declares that "this
case does not require us to, and therefore we
do not, decide whether a hypothetical
instance .of prolonged visual surveillance
would be a search subject to the walTant
requirement of the Fourth· Amendment."
Even
in the face of this declaration' I cannot
.
discern any distinction between the
supposed invasion by aggregation of data
between the GPS-augmented .surveillance
and a purely visual surveillance of
substantial length.
I would further note that the Seventh Circuit

in United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 883, 128
S.Ct. 291, 169 L.Ed.2d 140 (2007),
concluded that "GPS tracking is on the same
side of the divide with the surveillance
cameras and the satellite imaging, and if
what they do is not searching in Fourth
Amendment terms, neither is GPS tracking."
In light of its inconsistency with Supreme
Court jurisprudence and with the application
of the Fourth Amendment to similar
circumstances by other circuits, this deci~ion
walT ants enbanc consideration.
I
respectfully dissent from the denial.
KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, dissenting
from the denial of rehearing en banc:
I agree with Chief Judge Sentelle that the
panel opinion conflicts with the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Knotts. I
also share Chief Judge Sentelle's concern
about the panel opinion's novel aggregation
approach to Fourth Amendment analysis.
That is not to say, however, that I think the
Government necessarily would prevail in
this case. The defendant contended that the
Fourth Amendment was violated not only by
the police surveillance without a walTant
(the issue addressed in the panel opinion)
but also by the police's initial installation of
the GPS device on his car without a walTant.
The panel opinion .did not address the
defendant's alternative and narrower
property-based
Fourth
Amendment
. argument concerning the installation. In my
judgment, the. defendant's alternative
submission also poses an important question
and deserves careful consideration by the en
banc Court.
The Supreme Court has stated that the
Fourth Amendment "protects property as
well as privacy." As the defendant here
rightly points out, the police not only
16

engaged in surveillance by GPS but also
intruded (albeit briefly and slightly) on the
defendant's personal property, namely his
car, to install the GPS device on the vehicle ..
Because of the police's physical intrusion to
install the GPS device, this case raises an
issue that was not presented in Knotts. The
defendant in Knotts did not own the property
in which the beeper was· installed and thus
did not have standing to raise any Fourth
Amendment challenge to the installation of
the beeper. But Justice Brennan's concurring
opinion in Knotts foresaw the Fourth
Amendment issue posed by the police's
installing such a device:
"when the Government does engage
in physical intrusion of a
constitutionally protected area in
order to obtain information, that
intrusion may constitute a violation
of the Fourth Amendment even if the
same information could have been
obtained by other means."
460 U.S. at 286, 103 S.Ct. 1081.
As Justice Brennan noted in Knotts, the
Supreme Court precedent that· is perhaps
most relevant to this property-based
ffi'gument is the ,Court's unanimous 1961
decision in Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734. In
Silverman, the COUli concluded that
installation of a listening device on the
defendants' property (by accessing a heating
duct in a shared wall of the defendants' row
house) was subject to the FOUlih
Amendment. The Court reasoned that the
Fourth Amendment applied because of the
police's physical contact with the
defendants' property, which the' Court
variously characterized as: "unauthorized
physical penetration into the premises,"
"unauthorized physical encroachment within
a constitutionally protected area," "usurping

part of the petitioners' house or office,"
"actual intrusion into a constitutionally
area,"
and
"physically
protected
entrench[ingJ into a man's office or home."
The Court further determined that a physical
encroachment on such an area triggered
Fourth Amendment protection regardless of
the precise details of state or local trespass
law.
.
To be sure, since Silverman the Supreme'
Court has held that the Fourth Amendment
protects more than just property interests.
But as thoroughly explained in Soldal, the
Court has not retreated from the principle
that the Fourth Amendment also protects
property interests. '" [PJrotection for
property under the Fourth Amendment'
remains a major theme of the post-Katz era:
If a person owns property or has a close
relationship to the owner, access to. that
property usually violates his reasonable
expectation of privacy."
If Silverman is still good law, and I see no
indication that it is not, then Silverman may
be relevant to the defendant's alternative
argmnent
concerning
the
police's
installation of the GPS device. Cars are
"effects" under the text of the Fourth
Amendment, and are thus "constitutionally
protected areas" for purposes of Silverman.
Silverman- based
question,
The
key
therefore, is whether the police's installation
of a GPS device on one's car is an
"unauthorized physical encroachment within
a constitutionally protected area" in the
same way as installation of a listening
device on a heating duct in a shared wall of
a row house. One circuit judge has
concluded that the Fourth Amendment does
apply to installation of a GPS device:

Absent the police's compliance with
Fourth Amendment requirements,
"people are entitled to keep police
17

officers' hands and tools off their
vehicles. "

United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119,
113 5 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kleinfeld, J.,
concurring) .
Without full briefing and argument, I do not
yet know whether I agree with that

conclusion. Whether the police's mere
touching or manipulating of the outside of
one's car is a"physical encroachment within
a constitutionally protected area" requires
fuller deliberation. In any event, it is an
important and close question, one that the en
banc Court should consider along with the
separate issue raised by Chief Judge
Sentdle.
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"Supreme Court to Decide Whether Police Can
Attach GPS Device to a Car Without a Warrant"
Los Angeles Times
June 27,2011
David G. Savage

The Supreme Court agreed Monday to
decide whether police investigators seeking
to build a criminal case may put a tracking
device on a car without first obtaining a
search warrant.
The case, to be heard in the fall, figures to
be a major test of the government's power to
use electronic devices to secretly monitor
individuals.
At issue is whether tracking a motorist for
several weeks through the use of a global
.positioning system that has been attached to
his car qualifies as an "unreasonable search"
under the 4th Amendment.
Last year, a· U.S. appeals court in
Washington oveliurned Antoine Jones'
drug-trafficking conviction on the grounds
that FBI agents had used a GPS device to
track his Jeep for a month. The judges said
this kind of close monitoring for weeks on

end violates a person's
expectation of privacy."

"reasonable

In their appeal, Justice Department lawyers
maintain that "a person traveling on public
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation
of privacy." Since police investigators are
free to follow a car as it moves across town,
why is it an invasion of privacy to follow the
vehicle with a tracking device, they asked
The government also noted that U.S. appeals
courts in Chicago and San Francisco had
upheld the use of GPS devices to track crime
suspects.
The justices said they had voted to decide
the case of Us. vs. Jones and rule on
whether the suspect's 4th Amendment rights
were violated by "installing the GPS
tracking device on his vehicle without a
valid warrant and without his consent."
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"Court Asked to Balance Information Age Advances
with Constitutional Protections"
Washington Post
April 24, 2011
Robert Barnes

It's a wide, wired world out there, more so
every day, and the Obama administration is
asking the Supreme Court to let law
enforcement take advantage of it to build
cases against the bad guys.

phones and cars contain a wealth of
information about a person's movements,
and a smartphone can provide law
enforcement with vast amounts of
information.

The administration wants the justices to
overturn a decision last year by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that
said police must get a warrant before
launching a long-term surveillance of a
suspect using a global positioning device
attached to the man's car.

"This case is really going to confront the
court with the problem of adopting the
Fourth Amendment to a new information
age," said Daniel Prywes, a Washington
lawyer who wrote a brief in the Jones case
for the American Civil Liberties Union and
the Electronic Frontier Foundation.

In overturning the conviction of a D.C.
nightclub owner accused of being a
prominent cocaine kingpin, Acting Solicitor
General Neal Katyal said the appeals court
decision was not faithful to a Supreme Court
ruling that people have no expectation of
privacy when traveling along public streets.

"I think it's the seminal privacy case of the
21 st century."

"Prompt resolution of this conflict is
critically important to law enforcement
efforts throughout the United States," Katyal
told the court in a petition asking them to
take the case of United States v. Antoine
Jones.
Appeals courts in two other parts of the
country have sided with law enforcement on
the issue, saying police do not need a
warrant for the kind of prolonged
surveillance the GPS devices can provide.
The decisions come as judges increasingly
are asked to unravel the connection between
modem technology . and constitutional
protections of privacy and against
unreasonable searches. GPS devices in cell

Jones had been sentenced to life in prison
and ordered to surrender $1 million in drug
profits before the appeals court overturned
his conviction last year. For a month, police
had recorded his trips around the
Washington area-from his home to Levels,
his nightclub in Northeast D.C.-and
repeated trips to a stash house in Prince
George's County, where police eventually
found mounds of cocaine and $850,000 in
cash..
The government contends that the court has
already answered the question of whether
the surveillance of Jones was proper.
In 1983, the court ruled in United States v.
Knotts that police were within their power to
track a beeper device they had placed ih a
can of chemicals used for drug production.
"A person traveling in an automobile on
public . thoroughfares has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements
20

from one place to another," it said.
But an ideologically diverse panel of the
D.C. circuit was unanimous in saying that
. the justices in Knotts specifically did not
decide the issue of whether a more intrusive
governmenf action, such as "twenty-four
hour surveillance," would require a warrant.
Circuit Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg wrote
that the 28-day tracking of Jones's every
movement in his Jeep was too much.
Although the travel evidence submitted to
the jury was all on public streets, he said
"the whole of a person's movements over
the course of a month is not actually
exposed to the public because the likelihood
a stranger would observe all those
movements ... is essentially nil."
While no single trip can prove a pattern of a
person's life, Ginsburg wrote:
"A person who knows all of another's
travels can deduce whether he is a weekly
churchgoer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the

gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient
receiving medical treatment, an associate of
particUlar individuals or political groups."
When the full circuit declined to review the
panel's decision, Chief Judge David Sentelle
provided the opposing arguments for three
other dissenters ..
A person's reasonable expectation of
privacy while traveling on public highways
is zero, he said, and "the sum of an infinite
number of zero-value parts is also zero."
He said the panel's decision calls· into
question "any other police surveillance of
sufficient length" to establish a pattern.
Katya1 told the court that GPS tracking is a
vital tool for government in establishing the
kind of probable cause necessary to get a
warrant. Stifling its use at the early stages of
.an investigation, he said, "will seriously
impede the government's ability to
investigate leads and tips on drug
trafficking, terrorism and other crimes." ...
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"Appeals Court Limits Use of GPS
to Track Suspects"
Washington Post
August 7,2010
Spencer S. Hsu
A federal appeals court ruled for the first
time Friday that police cannot use a Global
Positioning System device to track a
person's movements for an extended time
without a warrant, clearing the way for the
Supreme Court to decide the privacy impact
of the new surveillance technology ih
products such as cellphones and vehiclenavigation systems.
. The decision, by a three-judge panel of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,
created a split with federal circuit cOUlis in
New York and California that have upheld
warrantless GPS -tracking of a vehicle by
law enforcement. Feeding the national
debate, a half-dozen state courts have issued
conflicting rulings, while police across the
country embrace GPS tools in hunting drug
dealers, sexual .predators and violent
criminals.
In striking down the drug conviction of
Antoine Jones, former co-owner of a District
nightclub called Levels, the D.C. cOUli said
the FBI and District police overstepped their
authority by tracking his movements roundthe-clock for four weeks, placing a GPS
monitoring device on his Jeep after an initial
warrant had expired.
U.S. Circuit Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg,
writing for a unanimous and ideologically
diverse panel that included judges David S.
Tatel and Thomas B. Griffith, said such .
surveillance technology represents a leap
forward in potential government intrusion
that violates constitutional protections
against unreasonable searches.

"A single trip to a gynecologist's office tells
little about a woman, but that trip followed a
few weeks later by a visit to a baby supply
store tells a different story," Ginsburg wrote.
He added, "A person who knows all of
another's travels can deduce whether he is a
weekly churchgoer, a heavy drinker, a
regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an
outpatient receiving medical treatment, an
associate - of patiicular individuals or
political groups-and not just one such fact
about a person, but all such facts."
Bill Miller, spokesman for U.S. Attorney
Ronald C. Machen Jr. of the District said,
"We're studying the opinion and have no
further comment."
Jones's attorney, Stephen Leckar, along with
the American Civil Liberties Union of D.C.
and the Electronic Frontier Foundation,
which filed friend of the court briefs, called
the case an important constitutional
precedent ready for Supreme Court review.
"This case is really a big step toward
bringing the Fourth Amendment into the
21st century," said Arthur Spitzer of the
D.C. ACLU. "The technology of the 21st
century needs to be judged on its own terms,
and not in terms of what some early 20thcentury technologies meant."
Kevin Bankston, senior staff attorney for the
Electronic Frontier Foundation, said the case
has important implications for cellphone
GPS tracking. The federal government has
mandated that U.S. cellphone carriers make
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nearly all their phones trackable for help in
911 emergencies. However, companies say
that the federal law that allows them to tum
over data to law enforcement without
subpoenas is prone to abuse.
Although federal magistrate judges typically
require walTants for GPS-enabled cellphone
tracking, the issue is before a federal circuit
court for the first time in Philadelphia,
Bankston said.
In the Jones vehicle-tracking case, civil
libeliarians say police should have obtained
ajudge's approval for a WalTant based on
probable cause that he was committing a
crime. Police argue that officers can freely
trail a person on public thoroughfares, and
using technology to do the same thing saves
taxpayer money and police resources.
The Supreme Court in 1983 held that the use
without a walTant of a "beeper"-like
transponder to track five gallons of

chemicals carried by a suspect in his car
from Minneapolis to a drug lab at a lakeside
cabin in Wisconsin was permissible. The
car's driver had no expectation of privacy
because he drove on public .roads and
"voluntarily conveyed to anyone who
wanted to look" where he was going.
However, the Court also noted that evidence
about the suspect's car monitored only a
single one-way trip, and withheld judgment.
about whether a warrant would be needed
for "dragnet-type" or "twenty-four hour
surveillance" by law enforcement. In
Friday's opinion, the D.C. appellate judges
focused on the unprecedented reach of new
technology, making surveillance possible
continuously and cheaply.
"Practical considerations prevent visual
surveillance from lasting very long.
Continuous human surveillance for a week
would require all the time and expense of
. several police officers," Ginsburg wrote.
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"Supreme Court Agrees to Review Case on GPS and
the Fourth Amendment"
The Volokh Conspiracy
June 27, 2011
Orin Kerr

According to this morning's order list, the
Supreme Court has agreed to review United
States v. Jones, the DC Circuit's "mosaic
theory" case on whether and when use of a
GPS device installed on a car is a Fourth
Amendment search. The Court added a
question, as well:
"Whether . the
government
violated
. respondent's Fourth Amendment rights by
installing the GPS tracking device on his
vehicle without a valid warrant and without
his consent."
I'm glad the Court granted in this case, and
I'm also also glad they added the question
on installing the device. The installation
question was the piece of the puzzle that was
strangely left out of the Knotts case thirty
years ago, and as' I· blogged back when
Judge Kavanaugh flagged the issue in his
dissent from denial of rehearing, I think its a
difficult and important question. (Lower
courts have uniformly held that installing the
device is not a search or seizure, but I've
never
found their reasoning very
persuasive.)
The fact that the Court added the question
about installing the device adds a really
interesting wrinkle to the Jones. case. Let's
. simplify .a tad and assume that the only issue
is whether the installation and/or use of the
GPS is a search or seizure-that is, let's
assume that if there is a search or seizure,
then it's unreasonable because there was no
valid warrant. If that's the case, then the
government needs five votes agreeing with it
on three different issues: (1) Installation of
the GPS is not a search or seizure; (2) Initial

use is not a search or seizure, cmd (3)I,ongtelID use is not a search or seizure.
Only question (3) implicates the rationale of
the DC Circuit's opinion, what I have called
the "mosaic theory," and it's always been
quite unlikely that the Supreme Court would
adopt that theory: It's such a radical
departure from anything that has come
before in Fourth Amendment law that it's .
pretty hard to imagine it getting five votes.
What makes the added question in Jones
intriguing is that argument (1) is probably
the argument most likely (if any) to swing
conservative Justices to the defense side. On
argument (2), KnottslKaro. has already
created an established line that has worked
for 30 years; I don't know if the
conservative Justices will be inclined to
mess with it. But the installing of the device
may give a Justice Scalia or Thomas second
thoughts; the act of installing the device is
the act of interfering with someone's private
property, and it likely would be a taking
under Fifth Amendment principles. Given
the historical connection between the Fourth·
Amendment and trespass law, it's
conceivable that an originalist Justice might
conclude that the interference with a
person's private property without a warrant
triggered by installing the device violates the
Fourth Amendment even if the subsequent
use does not.
With the current Court, the better bet in any
Fourth Amendment case is that the
Government .will win. But the added
question makes this a particularly
fascinating case to watch.
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"The Court Agrees to Hear a.Case About
Warrantless GPS Tracking on Cars"
Slate
June 27, 2011
Walter Dellinger

While you all are dissecting today's
opinions, I've been looking at the "orders
list." The court announced today that next
term it would hear and decide United States
v. Jones, a case asking whether the
wanantless tracking of vehicles by GPS
devices violates the Fourth Amendment. (I
should note that I'm working on the case
with my former student Stephen Leckar of
Shainis & Peltzman, who is counsel of
record for Antoine Jones.)
Federal law enforcement officials installed a
"global positioning system" device to track
every movement Jones, his wife, and his son
made in their vehicle for 24 hours of every
day for four weeks. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia determined that
this intensive monitoring of Jones'
movements for an extended period of time
invaded his reasonable expectation of
privacy and thus constituted a search under
the Fourth Amendment. Because the
government had no valid wanant (and made
no showing that the search was reasonable
without a wanant) the Court of Appeals
reversed Jones' conviction on drug charges.
In its petition asking the Supreme COUli to
review the case, the solicitor general stated
that federal law enforcement agencies
"frequently use" GPS tracking devices to
follow "leads and tips before suspicions
have ripened into probable cause." A
requirement that a warrant be obtained from
a magistrate before tracking an individual,
the government argued, "will seriously
impede criminal investigations" in "many
scenarios."

The solicitor general's petition focused on
the holding of the court below that the
tracking violated the Fourth Amendment.
While we opposed any review of the
decision below, we also suggested to the
court that if it granted the government's
petition, it should also address an additional
question: whether the installation of the
GPS device on Jones' car was itself a
violation of the Fourth Amendment. As
Judge Kavanaugh said in a concurring
opinion in the Court of Appeals, this
"property-based
Fourth
Amendment
argument" raises "an important and close
question." The Supreme Court granted this
second question as well, so next term it will
be deciding the conceptually separate
questions of: 1) whether a wanant is
required for the actual secret installation of a
GPS device on a person's automobile; and
2) whether a wanant is required for the
extended GPS tracking of a person's
movements in a vehicle.
The grant of review in this case sets the
stage for an extraordinary encounter
between the constitutional right against
unreasonable searches adopted at the end of
the 18th century and the amazing techriology
of the 21 st century. The "Navigational
Satellite Timing and Ranging Global
Positioning System" was developed in 1978
by the Department of Defense for military
use. In 2000, the government decided to
make accurate transmissions aval1able for
civilian use. And this led, inexorably, to the·
widespread use of GPS devices in
investigations. As my co-counsel Steve
Leckar noted in a statement today, "there is
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nothing inherently wrong with deploying
these devices to assist law enforcement. On
the other hand, no one can dispute that they
are extraordinarily intrusive." The issue is
not whether GPS devices can be used by law

enforcement, but .whether there should
generally be the age-old check of an
independent magistrate deciding whether the
search is justified before such a space-age
intrusion takes place ....
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"Police and High-Tech Monitoring"
SCOTUSblog
November 22,2010
Lyle Denniston

Like many Americans, police forces are
quick to .adopt new electronic devices,
capable of processing a wide range of
information despite the small size of many
such instruments-some as small as a pack
of gum. The Supreme Court is more
cautious in the face of advances in
technology, preferring to move slowly in
settling the new constitutional issues stirred
up. Next to testits approach, it appears, will
be police use of GPS tracking. One appeal
on the issue is already at the Court; another,
from the federal government, may not be far
behind.
GPS-or Global Positioning System-is a
way of using orbiting satellites to locate,
with accuracy to 100 feet or less,an object
or a place. In a car, a GPS device can tell
directions, and guide a motorist to the next
interchange, or the next fast-food restaurant.
It works by recording precise geographic
locations; one after the other. The device's
memory can show an entire trip. Obviously,
then, it is a good device for monitoring
someone's movements. And that is how
police departments are now using it-an
alternative to hidden cameras or visual
surveillance.
What the Court is now being asked to decide
is, first, whether a GPS track is a "search,"
under
the
Constitution's
Fourth
Amendment, and when might the continuous
monitoring of a track become an invalid
search if police do it without having a search
warrant. The Supreme Court left that second
question open wh~m, in Us. v. Knotts in
1983, it ruled that police use of an electronic
beeper to track a suspect's trip to a drug lab
was not a search. What seems to be newly at

issue is the role that the duration of tracking
plays in the constitutional equation; the
argument is that, the longer the tracking, the
more movements are monitored, the greater
the potential for invading privacy.
The issue may lead the Court into a
discussion of just when a car or truck
moving about in public places becomes not
an object of public viewing but a conveyor
of private information. The Court has often
allowed more police activity toward moving
vehicles than stationary, private places; the
"automobile exception" to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement goes
back to Carroll v. Us., a 1925 decision.
Earlier this month, lawyers for an Oregon
man, Juan Pineda-Moreno, filed the first
GPS tracking case at the Court (PinedaMoreno v. Us., docket 10-7515) .... The
Ninth Circuit Court ruled that such a track
was not a search[.]. .. A Circuit Court order
den[ied] en bane review, together with a
vigorous dissent[.]. .. There is a better-thaneven chance that the Court will hear .the
case-or perhaps the next case to come
along-because there . is widespread
disagreement among the lower federal and
state courts on the issue.
The next case that seems likely to follow
Pineda-Moreno to the Court could be one by
the federal government. It lost a case
involving a District of Columbia drug dealer
in the D.C. Circuit Court, conflicting
directly with the Ninth Circuit. ... Just last
Friday, the D.C. Circuit Court denied the
Justice Depatiment's plea for en bane
review by a 5-4 vote on the GPS issue[.] ...
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The government may tip its hand on its next
step when it responds to the Pineda-Moreno
petition; that response, unless the time is
extended, is now due on Dec. 17. Among
the government's other options would be to
agree that the Court should hear the Oregon
case, or urge the 'Justices to hold it while the
government pursues its own appeal in the
Maynard case (Lawrence Maynard's
companion case did not raise the GPS issue;
that was an issue for Antoine Jones in a
consolidated case. The government sought
rehearing only as to Jones and the GPS
question.)
The Oregon case began in the early summer
of 2007, when federal narcotics agents went
into the driveway of Juan Pineda~Moreno's
mobile home, and put a GPS tracking device
under the bumper of his Jeep Grand
Cherokee. Between June and September,
they made seven trips to the Cherokee,
sometimes ih the driveway, sometimes at the
curb, once at his workplace, installing GPS .
devices, some as small as a pack of chewing
gum, or. replacing the batteries. PinedaMoreno was completely unaware.
Ultimately, the four months of GPS tracking
turned up an alTay of information about
Pineda-Moreno's movements-where he
went, how long he stayed, the stops he
made. Most critically, they tracked the
vehicle to remote forest areas in southern
Oregon and northern California, leading to
the discovery of large plots of cultivated
marIJuana.·
Pineda-Moreno pleaded guilty to one count
of growing marijuana-more than 1,000
plants-and one count of a conspiracy to do
so. His guilty plea was on condition that he
could appeal to challenge the evidence
.gathered with the GPS tracking. He was
sentenced to four years and three months in
prison. The Ninth· Circuit, agreeing with the
trial court, found the GPS monitoring was

not a search under the Fourth Amendment.
In seeking Supreme Court review, his
lawyers raised two questions: first, whether
the prolonged monitoring via the GPS
devices was a search (the issue on which the
Ninth Circuit and D.C. Circuit explicitly
disagree), and, second, whether the secret
planting of the device on the Jeep while on
private property (the "curtilage" of his
mobile home) was an invalid search.
The petition, like the panel on the D.C.
Circuit in the case there, relied significantly
upon a passing comment that the Supreme
Court made as it decided the Knotts case 27
years ago. If surveillance round-the-clock of
"any citizen of this country" should occur
"without
judicial
knowledge
or
supervision," the Court said, "there will be .
time enough thento determine" whether that
was unconstitutional. That, according to
Pineda-Moreno's counsel, is his case.
The case, the petition asserted, "addresses
precisely the type of 'dragnet' monitoring of
personal information that this Court
expressly noted ... would warrant further
review." There is growing conflict and
inconsistency among both federal and state
courts on the Fourth Amendment and GPS
tracking, the filing argued.
Among other points discussing the Knotts
precedent, the petition suggested that· the
GPS device gave police' considerably more
opportunity to track private moverrients than
the beeper involved in that case. A beeper
operates on a radio frequency,so police
have to be within range of it to pick up the
signal, the petition noted, while GPS devices
"record all information as to the subject's
whereabouts and do not require police
tracking."
The D.C. Circuit relied upon that difference,
as well as on the prolonged nature of GPS
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monitoring, in declaring that the Antoine
Jones case was not controlled by what the
Supreme Court had held in the Knotts
decision. Other courts have felt directly
bound in GPS cases by Knotts, and the
Justice Department made that point when it
asked the D.C. Circuit to rehear en bane the
Jones case.
Federal prosecutors' rehearing petition in
the Jones case could be read as telegraphing
what a government appeal to the Supreme
Court in that case would argue. The D.C.
Circuit panel's decision on GPS tracking,
that ,document argued, "calls into question
the use many common and accepted forms
of surveillance of public places, such as
visual surveillance and fixed cameras .... If
the panel's opinion remains in force, well-

accepted investigative techniques such as
physical and photographic surveillance of
persons, places, and objects exposed to
public view could be called into question if
the use of those techniques were sufficiently .
'sustained' or 'prolonged. '"
The attorneys for Antoine Jones opposed
further review in the D.C. Circuit,
suggesting that the government was raising a
"sky is falling" claim, and arguing that the
panel had simply required agents "to get a
warrant before engaging in prolonged use of
GPS in a criminal investigation."
The debate over the scope and impact of that
ruling was taken up anew by dueling
opinions among the judges when en bane
review was denied.
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